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THE 'AMBITIOUS MODESTY" OF
HARRY ARTHURS' HUMANE
PROFESSIONALISM©
JULIAN WEBB*
This article revisits Law and Learning, the 1983
Report of the Consultative Committee on Research
and Education in Law, chaired by Harry Arthurs. The
Arthurs Report set an ambitious agenda which sought,
through the reform of legal education and scholarship,
the cultivation of a "humane professionalism." That it
met with limited success reflects a number of systemic
problems with legal education, and the Report's own
failure to address some critical issues, notably legal
pedagogy. Nevertheless, the article argues that in the
context of today's increasingly complex, pluralistic, and
globalized environment, the law schools need humane
professionalism more than ever. It thus concludes with
a set of normative assumptions and "ecological" design
principles by which law schools could develop a
pedagogy more consistent with that vision.
Ce document jette un nouveau regard sur Law
and Learning (La loi et l'apprentissage), rapport publi6
en 1983 par la Commission consultative de recherche
et d'enseignement du droit, pr6sid6e par Harry
Arthurs. L'ambitieux Rapport Arthurs avait pour objet
de cultiver le professionnalisme humain par le biais
d'une r6forme de l'enseignement du droit et des
bourses d'6tudes. La r6ussite du Rapport fut mitig6e,
cc qui met en relief un certain nombre de probllmes
syst6miques en mati~re d'enseignement du droit, et le
fait qu'on ait omis d'aborder des probl6mes plus
importants, notamment la p6dagogie du droit.
Nfanmoins, le document fait valoir qu'au sein d'un
environnement mondialis6, pluraliste et de plus en
plus complexe, les facult6s de droit ont plus que jamais
besoin de professionnalisme humain. En conclusion,
on pr6sente une s6rie d'hypothlses normatives et de
principes . 6cologiques . I partir desquels les facultfs
de droit pourraient 6laborer une p6dagogie plus
compatible avec cette vision.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of Harry Arthurs' many distinctions is that he has been an
important part of that small group of legal scholars who have taken legal
education sufficiently seriously to have both.written about its theory and
practice, and been in a position to shape its policy and future. In this
article I hope both to pay homage to his significant contribution to legal
education, and to consider how some of the themes in Arthurs' work
might be taken forward in the context of on-going challenges to legal
education in the Common Law world.
In doing so, I will focus primarily on the notion of humane
professionalism advanced in Law and Learning, the influential report of
the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, chaired by
Professor Arthurs, and still widely referred to as the Arthurs Report.' I
begin by exploring the concept of humane professionalism as developed
in the Arthurs Report, before looking at the changing context of legal
education. I consider why humane professionalism as an ideal is even
more important to us today, and offer a sense of how humane
professionalism might inform the pedagogy, not just the scholarship, of
the twenty-first century law school.
II. HUMANE PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ARTHURS
REPORT
The Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law was
appointed in 1980 to examine the state (and implicitly the status) of
legal research and scholarship in Canada. The report can be seen as an
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Law and Learning / Le
droit et le savoir." Report of the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (Ottawa:
The Council, 1983) [Arthurs Report]. As a matteri of personal history too, the Arthurs Report
represents the beginning of my own connection with Harry Arthurs' work, and was the impetus for
our first meeting. A year or so after publication of the Arthurs Report I was in my first academic
job in London, and heard Harry speak at a seminar on the report, organized by David Sugarman at
Middlesex University.
[VOL. 44, NO. I
Humane Professionalism
important part of a prolonged period of navel-gazing on the nature of
legal education and scholarship that has taken place in most major
common law jurisdictions. z These jurisdictions had seen significant
growth in the size and number of law schools during the 1960s and
1970s; law teaching had become increasingly professionalized, and yet
remained strikingly conformist.3 There was a pervading sense that all
was not well within the discipline. To take Canada as an example, the
1975 Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies had been critical
of the quality of Canadian legal scholarship and education;4 tensions
between the academic and practising professions were perceived to be
growing, as were tensions within the legal academy between traditional
doctrinalism and the newer interdisciplinary scholarship.' In this
context, both the Committee of Canadian Law Deans and the Canadian
Association of Law Teachers also saw a need for a thorough review that
might act as an engine of change.6
The Arthurs Report responded to this need enthusiastically,
with a raft-fifty-six in all-of mostly broad recommendations, inviting a
range of initiatives to improve the intellectual coherence and rigour of
legal education; to increase the quality and volume of legal scholarship;
to broaden its intellectual boundaries and the variety of both subjects
and pedagogies to which students were exposed; to narrow the
(scholarly) gap between academics and practitioners of law; and to
promote wider access to legal education and research.
I This was reflected in numerous official reports, aside from the Arthurs Report, including
the Ormrod (1972), Marre (1988) and ACLEC (1996) Reports in England, the Pearce Report
(1987) in Australia, and the McCrate Report (1992) in the United States. A number of these are
touched on below. For more or less contemporary examples of navel-gazing, see e.g. Mark Tushnet,
"Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1205; and Symposium: American
Legal Scholarship: Directions and Dilemmas (1983) 33 J.L. Educ. 403-58. The gloomier
prognostications in the United Kingdom included Geoffrey Wilson, "English Legal Scholarship"
(1987) 50 Mod. L. Rev. 818; Patrick McAuslan, "The Coming Crisis in Legal Education" (1989) 16
J. L. & Soc'y 310. Some of these criticisms were by no means new: see L.C.B. Gower's famous
attack on the "complacent apathy" and narrow doctrinalism of legal education, "English Legal
Training: A Critical Survey" (1950) 13 Mod. L. Rev. 137.
1 Robert Stevens, "American Legal Education: Reflections in the Light of Ormrod" (1972)
35 Mod. L. Rev. 242 at 243, 250ff.
4 T.H.B. Symons, To Know Ourselves. The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies
(Ottawa: Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, 1975) at 213-17.
' Phillip Slayton, "Law and Learning," Book Review of the Arthurs Report (1983) 33
U.T.L.J. 348 at 349.
6 Ibid. at 348.
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The Arthurs Report set out an ambitious agenda of reform. Was
it successful? Well, yes and no. In Canada, perhaps inevitably given the
contentiousness of many of the issues involved, it received a mixed
initial response from its constituencies and other commentators.7
Nevertheless, it must be credited with some notable successes. By
granting greater legitimacy to socio-legal work and through its part in
the founding of the Canadian Law and Society Association, the report
undoubtedly did much to open up a discipline traditionally renowned
for its insularity. It also provided a boost (albeit somewhat qualified) to
clinical legal education and to the teaching of law outside of the law
faculties. But many of its specific recommendations have been lost in the
mists of 'time. The discernible impact of the report has. been more
limited than its authors and supporters might have hoped.8
The influence of the Arthurs Report, however, was not limited
to Canada. It is likely no coincidence that academic reviewers outside
Canada were, overall, kinder than the locals; perhaps they could simply
afford to be less partisan.9 In England in particular, the report generated
considerable interest. It provided welcome international support for the
growing socio-legal movement,"° and it enjoyed something of a
7 See Johann W. Mohr, "Law and Learning Revisited: Discourse, Theory and Research"
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 671. See also the review articles and reviews published at the time,
including Mark Weisberg "On the Relationship of Law and Learning to Law and Learning' (1983)
29 McGill L.J. 155; Leon E. Trakman "Law and Learning" (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall L.J. 554; R.P.
Saunders, Book Review of Law and Learning(1984) 16 Ottawa L. Rev. 218; Slayton, supra note 5,
and the Osgoode Hall Law Journal Symposium, "After Arthurs-A Symposium on Canadian Legal
Scholarship" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 395-542.
' This has been discussed elsewhere at length, notably in Roderick A. Macdonald, "Still
'Law' and Still 'Learning'? Quel 'droit' et quel 'savoir'?" (2003) 18:1 C.J.L.S. 5 and Constance
Backhouse, "Revisiting the Arthurs Report Twenty Years Later" (2003) 18:1 C.J.L.S. 33. Arthurs
himself has attributed much of the report's relative lack of long term impact to its (perhaps
unsurprising) failure to anticipate the changing political economy of legal education-see Harry
Arthurs, "The Political Economy of Canadian Legal Education" (1998) 25 J. L. & Soc'y 14-as well
as its underestimation of the autonomous tendencies of law and legal education, discussed later in
this section [Arthurs, "Political Economy"]. Personal e-mail from Harry Arthurs (3 June 2005) [on
file with the author].
9See eg. John Henry Schlegel, "Langdell's Legacy Or, The Case of the Empty Envelope"
(1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1517; Ian Fletcher, Book Review of the Arthurs Report (1984) 4 L. Stud.
349 at 350.
"°The focus on teaching law "in context" had begun to emerge in a number of English law
schools in the 1960s. It was given greater legitimacy by the Ormrod Committee's assertion that it
was an "essential" that the law degree provide "an understanding of the relationship of law to the
social and economic environment in which it operates." (U.K., House of Commons, "Report of the
Committee on Legal Education", Cmnd 4595 in Sessional Papers (1970-1971) 1157 at para. 101)
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renaissance when it became a keystone of the 1996 Lord Chancellor's
Advisory Committee (ACLEC) Report into legal education and
training. 1 This was probably the first report on English legal education
to grapple seriously with the idea of creating a set of objectives for the
whole continuum of legal education and training.12 ACLEC was
particularly notable for its call to strengthen the "moral core" of both
academic and professional legal studies. In academic studies this was to
be achieved both by interdisciplinary study and by a greater emphasis on
subjects and pedagogies that would enable lawyers to "internalise from
the earliest stages of their education" an appropriate set of personal and
professional values and standards."
ACLEC too enjoyed a mixed reception. It was praised by those
who saw it as a way of enhancing the agenda of liberal education 4 or the
development of the largely non-existent ethical dimension of English
legal education. 5 But it was also criticised by some who foresaw the
consequences of the report's failure to take its socio-economic,
academic, and professional contexts sufficiently seriously, 6  and
challenged by others who feared that it opened the door wider to a
and by the subsequent founding of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Wolfson College, Oxford.
But the developments remained gradual and somewhat piecemeal: a nascent "Law and Society
Group" emerged in the late 1970s, but did not formally re-constitute itself into the Socio-Legal
Studies Association until its 1990 Conference. In other words, socio-legal studies remained and
essentially saw itself as a minority and oppositional discourse in England until at least the mid-
1980s. See C.M. Campbell & Paul Wiles, "The Study of Law and Society in Britain" (1976) 10 Law
& Soc'y Rev. 547; Philip A. Thomas, "Socio-Legal Studies: The Case of Disappearing Fleas and
Bustards" in Philip A. Thomas, ed., Socio-Legal Studies (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997) 1; and
Anthony Bradney, "Law as a Parasitic Discipline" (1998) 25 J. L. & Soc'y 71.
Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct, First Report
on Legal Education and Training (London: ACLEC, 1996) [ACLEC]. Professor Arthurs had been a
keynote speaker at ACLEC'S Second Consultative Conference in London in 1994.
1 It is arguable that this was also the original intention of the Ormrod Committee. See
Bob Hepple, "The Renewal of the Liberal Law Degree" (1996) 55 Cambridge L.J. 470 at 477-78.
13 ACLEC, supra note 11 at 20-21.
"
4 See e.g. Anthony Bradney, "Raising the Drawbridge: Defending University Law Schools"
(1995) 1 Web J.C.L.I., online: <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articlesl/bradneyl.html>; Hepple,
supra note 12.
's See e.g. Julian Webb, "Ethics for Lawyers or Ethics for Citizens? New Directions for
Legal Education" (1998) 25 J. L. & Soc'y 134; Kim Economides, "Learning the Law of Lawyering"
(1999) 52 Curr. Legal Probs. 392.
16 H.W. Arthurs, "Half a League Onward: The Report of the Lord Chancellor's Advisory
Committee on Legal Education and Conduct" (1997) 31 L. Teacher 1 [Arthurs, "Half a League
Onward"].
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
creeping vocationalism in academic legal education.1 7 In the end many
of its proposals for the academic stage were quietly ignored by much of
the academy, and those for the vocational stage rather more vigorously
rejected by the profession."
Regardless of the ultimate fate of the Arthurs and ACLEC
Reports, what generated the interest of many commentators was the
insistence on a unifying concept at the heart of the enterprise: what the
Arthurs Report called "humane professionalism." This was summarised
as. an approach which "avoid[s] narrow vocationalism ... [and
intensifies] present efforts to transmit liberal and humane intellectual
values, encourage[s] interdisciplinary study, and ensure[s] some
exposure to legal theory and legal research."19
The Arthurs Report represented the case for humane
professionalism as building on what the law schools already professed
their mission to be:
Canadian law schools imagine themselves to be offering a legal education that is humane
and professional, rather than narrowly vocational. They generally identify three elements
as characteristic of this type of legal education:
Learning legal rules (what we will call "doctrine," recognizing the somewhat different
common law and civil law connotations of the term) and developing the ability to use the
rules;
Learning legal skills (such as interviewing, advocacy and negotiation);
Developing a humane perspective on law, and a deeper understanding of law as a social
phenomenon and an intellectual discipline.
20
But this was not the reality that Arthurs found. Canadian legal
education had, according to the Artburs Report, remained resolutely
vocational in its orientation: "the humane elements ... do not
17Bradney, supra note 14.
"Note that following its initial rejection by the professional bodies, the ACLEC philosophy,
if not necessarily the detail, seems to have been resurrected in an on-going-and highly
contentious-Training Framework Review by which the Law Society (of England and Wales) is
seeking to create a set of training outcomes governing the whole process of training from admission
to law school to "day one" qualification as a solicitor. See further Julian Webb & Amanda
Fancourt, "The Law Society's Training Framework Review: On the Straight and Narrow or the
Long and Winding Road?" (2004) 38 L. Teacher 293.
'9 Arthurs Report, supra note 1 at 155.
2
9 Ibid. at 47.
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predominate, 21 the report observed; and even more pithily, "even if it
were magnificent, it is not academic. '2 The research and teaching of the
law schools were still dominated by a narrow, "black letter" analytical
perspective, despite (as the report saw it) legal education's espoused
theory of its "humane" and "liberal" function. The remedy was, of
course, a fundamental reform of legal scholarship.
The Arthurs Report, therefore, was a hugely ambitious
enterprise: it sought nothing less than the transformation of the
intellectual milieu of the law school. As Leon Trakman has observed,
the report clearly adopted a "distinct ideological position." 3 It located
legal education as a site of personal and professional formation (not just
training) shaped fundamentally by a wider "humane" intellectual
tradition of research. It was research and scholarship, not teaching or
practice that would equip the academy to fulfil its role as the purveyor
of humane professionalism.
Perhaps the relort was even more ambitious than that. On re-
reading the Arthurs Report I found myself wondering: why humane
professionalism? Much of the report patently emphasizes the humane
over the professional. Indeed, the professional is defined almost entirely
by implication, often (though not always) in relatively negative terms:
the professional agenda is narrowly practical and career-oriented;24 it is
less broad and less critical about law than the humane agenda; 5 its
"analytical perspective" is juxtaposed unfavourably with the "reflective
and interdisciplinary" perspectives and values of other scholars. 6 So why
does the Arthurs Report maintain humane professionalism as its aim for
legal education, rather than the "mere" humanism it sees at the heart of
the enterprise of liberal education. Is humane professionalism in fact a
non sequitur, a contradiction in terms? Or is it a deliberately
paradoxical conjunction of the kind that lawyers love-rather like
neutral partisanship-in which the tension between concepts itself has
the capacity to create new meanings and practices? Or is Arthurs too
21 Ibid. at 54.
22 Ibid. at 55.
2 ?Trakman, supra note 7 at 555.
2 4Arthurs Report, supra note 1 at 136.
25 Ibid. at 48.
26 Ibid. at 137.
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cannily pragmatic to dump professionalism? To convey the nuances, it is
worth quoting at length from what I take to be two key passages of the
report, passages that set up powerful, albeit largely a priori,
justifications for humane professionalism:
[Wihile the cultivated ability to stand at a distance from conventional wisdom, to view it
critically, must be defended on its intrinsic merits as being the essence of education, it
also has at least three important "practical" benefits. It enables lawyers to adapt to
changes when they occur, to assist in bringing about such changes through law reform
and other public activities, and to accomplish change themselves in the limited context of
serving individual clients whose interests do not coincide with accepted solutions. From
the student's perspective, having to deal with both the intellectual and the practical at
once generates a dialectic which, if it does not necessarily improve the end product, at
least contributes to the student's tough-mindedness. This may help to explain why law
schools in their humane intellectual activities, may make a contribution to preparation
for professional practice that is both vitally important and easily overlooked.27
A profession that lacks a scientific base cannot properly serve either its clientele or an
increasingly complex society, cannot maintain a credible claim to its privileges and
powers, cannot attract to itself the best minds or employ those minds to best effect. Nor,
for specific historical and cultural reasons can such a scientific base for law flourish at
too great a distance from the project of law as it has been understood by practising
lawyers. After all, in large part it is their formal literature, institutions culture and
behaviour that provide a focus for scientific study ... . [T]he scholarly enterprise of law
can flourish neither divorced from the profession, nor in its close embrace, nor in hand-
to-hand combat with it. Its best prospect for growth and development is therefore to take
up a position within the law faculties as a distinct and separate endeavour, with its own
goals, standards and basis of legitimacy. Only such a stance will at once stimulate
energies, promote sensible interdisciplinary cooperation and provide a free and equal
basis for exchange between scholars and practitioners."
The report thus seems to answer both of my latter questions in
the affirmative;29 the juxtaposition is justified intellectually and
pragmatically, and these levels of justification are themselves closely
interwoven. Aside from the simple fact that in Canada, as in most
jurisdictions, the legal profession provides the primary employment
market for law graduates,3" and so for that very pragmatic reason, the
law schools cannot ignore the needs of the profession, there is perceived
to be a deeper symbiotic relationship between the academy and the
27 Ibid. at 49-50.
28Ibid. at 137-38, 140.
29 The language remains notably tentative: these are more suppositions than firm
conclusions.
'9 In fact, in the United Kingdom now, only about half of the students graduating with law
degrees actually enter the profession.
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profession. As the report argues in these sections, the humane base of
the discipline itself helps to legitimate the professional project of
lawyers, and equips students with the skills and .capacities that, today,
are often associated with the ideal of the "reflective practitioner";31 at
the same time the practice of law also provides a vital cultural, literary,
and institutional context for academic study.
But I believe the ambition of the Arthurs Report went well
beyond a narrow legitimation of or symbiosis between the professional
and academic projects of law. Rather, it is through the humanising
power of education that the report ultimately seeks the redemption of
(legal) professionalism itself. Professionalism as a concept has a
chequered history. Indeed, as Zacharias observes, "[n]o term in the legal
lexicon has been. more abused than professionalism."32 As the history
and sociology of the professions shows, professionalism stands both for
narrow self-interest, cynicism, and social remoteness, as well as for the
more noble commitments to justice, integrity, and altruism.33 There is, in
short, something almost schizophrenic about professionalism. The idea
of lawyering as a public good has, in truth, always been ambiguous. In
the eyes of the public, legal professionalism is "tainted" both by its
association with the criminal underclass-reflected in the classical
question: "how can you defend people like that"-and its sometimes
blinkered advancement of corporate interests.34 Yet the popular image
of "lawyer as hero" also remains strong, particularly-in media portrayals.
As Freidson observes:
31 See notably Donald A. Sch6n, Educating the Reflective Practitioner (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1987) and "Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner" (1995) 2 Clinical L. Rev. 231.
See also Julian Webb, "Where the Action Is: Developing Artistry in Legal Education" (1995) 2 Int'l
J. L. Profession 187 [Webb, "Where the Action Is"].
32 Fred C. Zacharias, "Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interest" (1995) 36 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1303 at 1307.
3 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Harold Perkin argued that the "Achilles'
heel" of the professions was their "individual arrogance, collective condescension to the laity and
mutual disdain [for each other]." The Rise of Professional Society (London: Routledge, 1989) at
390. See also e.g. Richard L. Abel, "The Decline of Professionalism?" (1986) 49 Mod. L. Rev. 1 and
"The Poltics of Professionalism: The Transformation of English Lawyers at the End of the
Twentieth Century" (1999) 2 Legal Ethics 131; A.A. Paterson, "Professionalism and the Legal
Services Market" (1996) 3 Int'l J. L. Profession 137.
-4 The references here could run to pages, but see e.g. Robert F. Cochran Jr.,
"Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate
Sources of Virtue" (2000) 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 305; Robert W. Gordon,
"Professionalisms Old and New, Good and Bad" (2005) 8:1 Legal Ethics 23.
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For well over a century in the iconography of popular media it is professionals who are
the "crusaders" seeking Justice, Health, Truth, and Salvation. While it is common to see
physicians and lawyers, scientists and professors, and sometimes journalists and
politicians in that principled role, one does not see bankers, stockbrokers, or business
executives. There is, then, still some popular foundation for the professional's claim of
license to balance the public good against the needs and demands of the immediate
clients or employers. Transcendent values add moral substance to the technical content
of disciplines."
However, in late modernity, it is increasingly the negative side of
professionalism that has come to dominate the public perception.
Professionalism has become not just the Shavian "conspiracy against the
laity" but something darker. Rooted historically in the enormous breach
of trust, the perverted professionalism of those lawyers, doctors, judges,
and scientists who gave up their humanity before the "great madness of
the Third Reich,"36 the world has become increasingly sceptical of
professional expertise, and those who claim it.37 It is in this context,
then, that the very conjunction of "humane professionalism" can be seen
as part of an attempt to restore the balance, to re-assert that moral
virtue which should attach to professionalism, but which
"professionalism," without more, cannot sustain.
So why do I still suggest that the Arthurs Report was in fact
caught in the tensions of an ambitious modesty? Part of the answer lies
in the presentation. For all its vision and ambition, the Arthurs Report
was in some regards tentative (a word, I know, that cannot often be
associated with Harry Arthurs). It sought to emphasise the exploratory
and preliminary nature of its inquiry: it was clearly intended as the
beginning, not the end of a process of dialogue about the purposes of
legal education, and many of its recommendations were broadly drawn
indications of policy rather than specific actions. But its modesty also
goes beyond that.
The report-rightly, I suggest-saw the dominance of what it
called "eclecticism" in curriculum design as a problem.38 This again was
'
5Eliot Freidson, Professionalismr. The ThirdLogic(London: Polity Press, 2001) at 221-22.
'
6 Alain Finkielkraut, In the Name of Humanity (London: Pimlico, 2001) at 2. See also
Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
" A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1990); Piotr Sztompka, "Trust, Distrust and Two Paradoxes of Democracy" (1998) 1 Eur. J. Soc.
Theory 19. This is not to ignore the late twentieth century "backlash against professional society"
launched in the name of the free market and public interest: see Perkin, supra note 33 at c. 10.
8 Supra note 1 at 56-58.
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not an experience unique to Canada. In the United States, for example,
the relaxation of close professional control allowed law schools to
experiment with the introduction of new course offerings. Electives and
seminars proliferated, new pedagogies emerged, and yet, as John Henry
Schlegel succinctly put it in 1984, "students on both sides of the [U.S.]
border, though offered an incredible smorgasboard of choices, choose
the same narrow collection of bar exam basics and hate them."3 9 The
vagaries of student-led demand and faculty-led supply, within a context
still shaped strongly by doctrinalism, effectively marginalized many
attempts to open up the curriculum in particularly innovative or,
perhaps, threatening ways.
Arthurs' response to this phenomenon was to invoke a notion of
pluralism: "a genuine choice of identifiable alternatives,"4 which might
involve either the re-packaging and refocusing of a law school's
activities, or enabling students to make a rational choice between
"academic" and "professional" curricula. In effect, this was a precursor
to the more modern notion of modular pathways. This seemingly simple
idea proved highly optimistic in its expectation that the Canadian system
of legal education (or any similar one) might evolve into a kind of
planned economy. Here the report seems to have underestimated the
modesty of law school ambitions. Relatively few law schools have sought
to take the game of market differentiation seriously. Moreover, the
report also underestimated the conservatism of both faculty and
prospective students and their continuing deference to the professional
curriculum. As one law school dean has recently observed, "the primary
goal of the great majority of ... students is still to receive a legal training
that is broad and well-rounded enough to enable them to compete for
jobs in the legal profession not just locally, but nationally and,
increasingly, internationally."41
To suggest that the emphasis on pluralism was a weakness may
seem somewhat counter-intuitive, and indeed the report's intention to
move from an "eclectic" to a "pluralist" system of legal education was
undoubtedly intended as progressive. But it also allowed the
Consultative Group to substitute what was really an "ideal type" for a
39 Schlegel, supra note 9 at 1528.
40 Arthurs Report, supra note 1 at 56.
4 Joost Blom, "Introduction: Looking Ahead in Canadian Law School Education" (1999)
33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 7 at 16.
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solution. In retrospect, the report did not sufficiently address the
practical question of what it would take to embed "humane
professionalism" as a long-term process of cultural transformation.
In particular, the Arthurs Report insufficiently addressed the
need to embed humane professionalism in pedagogy, not just content.
The report says relatively little about teaching 42 and even less about
pedagogy in any deep sense of that term.43 Its conclusions focus
primarily on content and the appropriate scholarly approach to
substantive law. In this respect, it is part-and by no means the worst
example-of an overwhelming pattern not just of content-dominated
reviews of legal education across the common law world, but of
scholarly indifference to the theory of legal education itself.' Yet such
theorizing is critical. We should not ignore the extent to which the
medium really does influence the message, all the way down to the deep
ontological structures of law and lawyering. 45 To this extent, though the
Report has been critical in advancing the case for an interdisciplinary
legal scholarship, its modesty finally overstepped its ambition. It signally
failed to identify how humane professionalism, if taken sufficiently
42 It did recommend an expansion of clinical education, and the greater development of
research and writing skills through the production of student research papers, but these were hardly
ground-breaking, even in 1983.
43 I am not the first to suggest that the report did not take teaching sufficiently seriously.
See Graham Parker, "Legal Scholarship and Legal Education" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 653;
Diana Majury, "Teaching is Part of Legal Education" (2003) 18:1 C.J.L.S. 51.
' See Fiona Cownie, "The Importance of Theory in Law Teaching" (2000) 7 Int'l J. L.
Profession 225, and Julian Webb, "Why Theory Matters" in Julian Webb & Caroline Maughan,
eds., Teaching Lawyers' Skills (London: Butterworths, 1996) 23. Majury's concern, ibid., that
teaching is actually of diminishing importance in Canadian legal education is also reflected to some
degree in the United Kingdom where a "publish or perish" approach to career progression has
been increasingly fostered by the culture of research assessment. This was not helped by concerns
that legal education research was possibly marginalized in the earlier research assessment exercises,
nor by the fact that quite a lot of legal education research has, quite simply, not been of good
quality. But the picture is not entirely gloomy. My sense is that legal education research and
scholarship is becoming increasingly robust and even mainstream in the United Kingdom, with
papers appearing in established peer-reviewed journals and supported by a growing number of
journals that have legal education as the whole, or an explicit part, of their focus. See the Law
Teacher (first published in 1966); the International Journal of the Legal Profession (1994); Web
Journal of Current Legal Issues (1995); Legal Ethics (1998); Journal of Commonwealth Law and
Legal Education (2001) and the European Journal of Legal Education (2003). This proliferation of
journals is itself largely a product of the growing research (audit) culture. See also A. Bradney,
"The Rise and Rise of Legal Education" [1997] 4 Web J.C.L.I., online: <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/
1997/issue4/ bradney4.html>.
4 See further Part IV of this article.
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seriously, could change our perception not only of what law should be
taught, but how it should be taught, and indeed, of how pedagogy might
contribute, in turn, to the idea of humane professionalism itself.
This criticism may seem to cast doubt on the capacity of
"humane professionalism" to act as the rallying call for the re-
invigoration of the academy. But that is not the direction I intend to
pursue. Indeed quite the reverse: it is the argument of this article that
we need humane professionalism now more than ever. In the following
pages I will explore why humane professionalism is still important to us
today, and consider what a pedagogy built on humane professionalism
might involve.
III. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE(S) OF LEGAL EDUCATION
If we are to take humane professionalism seriously we first need
to take the context of legal education seriously. That context has
changed substantially since 1981. In Canada, Britain, and elsewhere,
legal education operates within a complex, densely pluralistic, and
increasingly globalized environment, shaped both by changes in higher
education policy and the market for legal services. Arthurs himself has
recently observed:
It is not possible to think usefully about legal education without thinking about law itself
... about its complexity and polycentricity, its political and economic functions in the
larger society, its social origins and cultural significance, its epistemology and
deontology. Nor is it possible to think about the architects, theorists, practitioners,
critics, clienteles, benefactors, and beneficiaries of legal education without recalling that
they are also embedded in the larger polity, society, economy, culture, professional ethos,
and higher education system-all dynamic and conflicted systems. Nor finally, can we
ignore the fact that the relationships amongst these actors constitute an internal political
economy, which does much to define the character and strategies of the legal academy.46
This complex interplay of forces has undoubtedly had some
positive consequences for legal education and scholarship. Few would
disagree that the majority of law schools are more intellectually
interesting, more multi-cultural, and less insular places than they were
46 Harry W. Arthurs, "Poor Canadian Legal Education: So Near to Wall Street, So Far
From God" (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 381 at 402-03 [Arthurs, "Poor Canadian Legal
Education"].
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twenty or thirty years ago.47 Expectations of research, hiring parameters,
and the career trajectories of academic lawyers have become more like
the university norm. But at the same time, changes to both the political
economy and intellectual environment of higher education have added
to a pervading sense of uncertainty about the future direction or even
possibility of our endeavour.
The causes of this uncertainty are too well known on both sides
of the Atlantic to require detailed discussion. Functional complexity and
uncertainty is increasingly shaping the terrain of lawyering itself.48 The
lawyers and legal academics of the twenty-first century are operating in
a transitional environment that is re-shaping (and perhaps recursively
being re-shaped by) the profession and perceptions of professionalism.
National legal professions are becoming more fragmented by the
growing divergences between global, national, and local legal practice;
the emergence of new forms of lawyering; the changing inter- and intra-
professional division of labour and pressures for de-professionalization
(for example the challenge from forensic accountancy, and the
expanding roles of in-house lawyers and paralegals);49 and continuing
deregulation." Among the potential casualties of this environment are
the notions that there is a common core of professional knowledge, and
that a common professional training may be maintained. As Deborah
Rhode has observed in the U.S. context:
j. Webb, "Turf Wars and Market Control: Competition and Complexity in the Market
for Legal Services" (2004) 11 Int. J. L. Profession 81 [Webb, "Turf Wars"].
' These issues are explored in the Canadian context, inter alia, by H.W. Arthurs
"Lawyering in Canada in the 21st Century" (1996) 15 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 202; Harry W.
Arthurs & Robert Kreklewich, "Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New
Economy" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; and W. Wesley Pue, "Foxes, Henhouses, Unfathomable
Mysteries, and the Sufferance of the People: A Review of Regulating Professions and Occupations"
(1996) 24 Man. L.J. 283. In the English context, see notably Richard L. Abel, English Lawyers
Between Market and State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), and the symposium thereon
published in (2004) 11 Int'l J. L. Profession 3-156.
50 A prime example is the recent Clementi Review of the Anglo-Welsh market for legal
services. Sir David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in England
and Wales Final Report, online: <www.legal-services-review.org.uk>. However it should be noted
that regulatory form is on the agenda across the European Union (EU), under the influence of EU
competition policy. R. Parnham, "Lawyers poised on brink of brave new world" 47 European
Lawyer (April 2005) 20.
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It is time to reconsider whether an occupation as large and varied as the American bar is
well served by a unified regulatory structure. The profession needs to recognize in form
what is true in fact. Lawyers with diverse backgrounds and practice contexts need
different preparation and sources of guidance. Our current one-size-fits-all model of
legal education and professional education badly needs revision.5
In light of this changing professional culture, there is growing
recognition that education needs to look beyond legal knowledge as we
have conventionally defined it. If as Friedson suggests, "transcendent
values" do indeed "add moral substance to the technical content of
disciplines,"52 we cannot afford (assuming we ever could) to treat
learning law as just about substantive knowledge and skills. We need to
carefully consider our part in the development of students' attitudes and
values.53 In fact, I would argue that this goes beyond simply enhancing
the profession's professionalism. The very process of participating in the
articulation and choice of values is integral to constituting the academy
itself as a moral community. But let us also be aware of the kind of
conundrum that is involved here.
Discourse about "values" has been one of the defining features
of modernity, and yet "values" is nevertheless a problematic and
slippery concept. We often use it to capture a yearning for a "possible
world that we try to make more actual in our conduct,"" a reaching
towards an imagined future. But the language of values can also carry
s' "The Professionalism Problem" (1998) 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 283 at 317; the recent
and controversial proposals by the English Law Society to create more flexible pathways to
qualification would seem consistent with this same post-Fordist logic. See Webb & Fancourt, supra
note 18.
52 Friedson, supra note 35.
s See e.g. the McCrate Report, Legal Education and Professional Development - An
Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing
the Gap (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1992) (statement of lawyering values); the (English)
Law Society's Second nsuatbnonaNewTraiingFrariorkfcrSdiccirs (London: The Law
Society, 2003) (including "the values, behaviours, attitudes and ethical requirements of a solicitor"
as part of its "high-level definition" of the competences expected of a newly-qualified solicitor); and
the report of the Canadian Bar Association Joint Multi-disciplinary Committee on Legal
Education, Attitudes, Skills, Knowledg. Recommendations for Changes to Legal Education to
Assist in Implementing Multi-option Civil Justice Systems in the 21st Century (Ottawa: Canadian
Bar Association, 2000) at ii notes, inter alia, that the move to alternative dispute resolution "will
require a more reflective and self-conscious stance on the part of lawyers in considering their
personal responsibility for affecting the process of settlement."
-4 Neil MacCormick, "The Ideal and the Actual of Law and Society" in J. Tasioulas, ed.,
Law, Values and Social Practices (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997) 15 at 30.
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with it an attachment to a past, real or imagined,55 a view of the world in
which, as Nietzsche observed, all value has already been created.
Values-talk can thus spin off in many directions-to be both
revolutionary and reactionary, personal and political, to define collective
responsibilities and somebody else's problem.
And this is perhaps the crux of our problem: in an increasingly
individualistic, secularized, and multi-cultural Western world,
meaningful values-talk has become, if anything, more difficult to sustain.
In general, we enjoy freedom of choice (as we choose to define it!) on a
hitherto unimagined scale, and yet with that freedom has come the
burden of greater moral ambiguity and uncertainty. It is perhaps one of
the great, though surely not unexpected, ironies of modernity that in
obtaining our freedom from an existence shaped by pre-ordained,
universal values, and taking on our own shoulders the responsibility for
choosing the values we live by, our collective uncertainty about what
those values should be has only grown. As Hans Jonas has observed,
"we need wisdom most when we believe in it least., 56 Indeed, the
paradox is that while humankind has developed the power to impact the
world on a truly global scale, each of us operates within a lifeworld that
seems to give us less power not just over external events, but even over
our own lives and moral choices. These lives have become more
fragmented, more dominated by a dislocating sense of change, more
dispensible. We are indeed players of many parts, yet "none of the roles
seems to take hold of our 'whole selves.' ' 57
How should law schools respond to this complex environment
that seems to be both simultaneously value-laden and value-free?
Assuming that we should be making the discussion of values (more)
explicit in the curriculum, with whose values should we be (most)
concerned: our students', the academy's, the profession's, the legal
system's, or society's? What kinds of values should we be addressing: the
personal and moral values (honesty, integrity, et cetera) of individual
actors; their economic or even aesthetic values, the values that
constitute the "being-with" of a moral community; the "organizational"
s One may find such an example in political calls for a return to "family values" or the
equally problematic notion of "community values."
56 Philosophical Essays. From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1974) at 178.
57 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) at 19.
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values of institutional players? What about the interplay between values
and professional ethics? How should we respond, in an increasingly
bureaucratized world, to the pervading sense that our responsibility is
no longer ours to own? That it is merely the responsibility of the role we
occupy, for as long as we occupy it. It is a responsibility that is
increasingly defined and delimited by standards, rules, and codes of
conduct, rather than the product of our own moral reflection. And the
danger of such codified moral responsibility is that it appears to be
everywhere and yet adheres nowhere. 8 These are all substantial and
contentious questions which few of the formal reviews of legal education
have ever sought to address in any depth.59
These questions are made perhaps even more pressing by the
extent to which legal education is becoming co-opted to what Arthurs
has called the "globalization of the mind": a special form of
globalization in which knowledge workers seek to participate in a
transnational discourse, shaped by the institutions and structures of
global capital.6" In this context we need to recall that the political
economy of higher education as a whole, and legal education in
particular, has changed radically over the course of the last two
decades," induced by an increasing marketization and corporatization
of higher education. I will limit myself to three main observations to
illustrate the point.
First, in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and to a
lesser extent, Canada, legal education, is exposed to the public gaze of
the "audit society," and subject to (quasi-)market forces to a degree that
5 8 Bauman thus talks of responsibility that "floats among the players." See ibid., and Alone
Agair Ethics After Certainty (London: Demos, 1994). See also David Luban, Alan Strudler &
David Wasserman, "Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy" (1992) 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2348.
-' As noted in supra note 53, the U.S. McCrate Report did attempt to construct a set of
lawyering values, though this resulted in a list of predictably general statements exhorting the values
of providing competent representation, striving to promote justice, maintaining and improving the
profession, and professional self-development. But see generally the critique of McCrate by Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, "Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the McCrate
Report - Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being" (1994) 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593.
' H. W. Arthurs, "Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of the
Legal Field" (1998) 12:2 C.J.L.S. 219.
61 For Arthurs' own contributions to this literature, see notably Arthurs, supra notes 8 and
49; Arthurs & Kreklewich, supra note 49; and "The World Turned Upside Down: Are Changes in
Political Economy and Legal Practice Transforming Legal Education and Scholarship, or Vice
Versa?" (2001) 8 Int'l J. L. Profession 11.
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is unparalleled in recent history. Law school rankings, and formal or
informal assessments of teaching and research quality, increasingly
inform both our own and public perceptions of the academy. All this is
happening, too, in a context where the state-financed unit of resource
has steadily declined in real terms. Reliance on private funding through
tuition fees, full-cost courses, endowments, and gifts, has become
increasingly normalized,62 albeit more so in Canada than the United
Kingdom.
Legal education, perhaps more obviously in the United
Kingdom and Australia than in Canada, has become part of a mass
education system.63 Law has maintained exceptional popularity. The
number of law schools has expanded, most notably in Australia, where
the number of schools more than doubled in a decade, but also in the
United Kingdom.'M In the United Kingdom particularly, student
numbers have increased exponentially, and generally at a significantly
higher rate than faculty hiring. Class sizes in the United Kingdom have
also grown and, in some instances, individual class-contact hours
reduced, creating concerns about the maintenance of teaching quality,
though these are often left publicly unspoken (not least because we are
very conscious of the increasingly consumerist expectations of students
and funding bodies).
The sustained popularity of law has been a double-edged sword
for the law schools. It has enabled the majority of them to expand on the
back of a pool of well-qualified applicants and insulated them from the
threats of "downsizing" or closure that have afflicted other departments.
But this very popularity has been widely exploited by university
managers, to increase numbers and turn law schools into cash cows that
can be used to cross-subsidise less economically viable parts of the
enterprise. At the same time, the range of educational "products" has
also expanded to tap more lucrative graduate and international markets.
62 C. Backhouse, "The Changing Landscape of Canadian Legal Education" (2001) 20
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 25.
6 See e.g. Julian Webb, "Post-Fordism and the Reformation of Liberal Legal Education"
in Fiona Cownie, ed., The Law School. Local Issues, Global Ouestions (Aldershot: Dartmouth,
1999) 228 [Webb, "Post-Fordism"].
' The number of law schools in the United Kingdom increased from 48 in 1975 to 85 in
2000 according to A. Bradney & F. Cownie, "British University Law Schools in the Twenty-First
Century" in David J. Hayton, ed., Law's Future(s): British Legal Developments in the 21st Century
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) 1 at 1-2.
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In an increasing number of schools, anecdotal evidence suggests that
delivering the LL.B. is no longer the core activity. Increasingly taught by
part-time lecturers, graduate teaching assistants, and the "research
inactive," it has been pushed aside by the perceived need for (or desire
of) more experienced and senior members of faculty to deliver higher
value graduate programmes, supervise Ph.D.'s and pursue funded
research.65
The growing internationalization of legal education also
presents us with a. range of opportunities and threats.66 There is an
important-and under-explored-nexus between the increasing
internationalization of legal business and the internationalization of
legal education. The centralization of cross-border legal work in the
major global (notably New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong) and
regional cities (for example Brussels, Sydney, and Toronto) has
interesting consequences for the law schools. It influences the hiring
practices of the global elite law firms affect the national and
international standing of the top schools, shapes what students perceive
to be (practically) important or exciting areas of law, and affects
demand-led curriculum priorities and hiring practices of the law schools
themselves.67
The growing significance of regional trading blocs, the expansion
of cross-border trade, and the accompanying development of principles
of international economic law have supported a significant re-centring
of the legal curriculum around corporate law and international trade,
often at the expense of more welfare-oriented fields that are significant
in underpinning local citizens' access to justice. There is also a question
over how far the perceived international elite law schools will use their
status, resources, and technology to extend their reach in the global
market for education. Concerns are already being voiced in Canada and
the United Kingdom, for example, that some of the elite U.S.
universities have the size and capacity to develop joint ventures,
'This is also a phenomenon in Australia. See J.H. Wade, "Legal Education in Australia-
Anomie, Angst, and Excellence" (1989) 39 J. Legal Educ. 189 at 198.
' See generally John Flood, "Legal Education, Globalization and the New Imperialism" in
Cownie, "The Law School," supra note 63; Arthurs, "Poor Canadian Legal Education," supra note
46; and W. Wesley Pue, "Globalization and Legal Education: Views from the Outside-In" (2001) 8 Int'l
J. L. Profession 87.
67 See M. Thornton, "Among the Ruins: Law in the Neo-Liberal Academy" (2001) 20
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 3.
20061
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44, NO. I
offshore campuses, and distance education projects in a way that local
providers cannot. The possibility, under initiatives such as the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 68 and the Bologna accord,69 of a
highly deregulated international market in education also raises
concerns about the preservation of local (legal) cultures and values.
We cannot leave this area without also considering what Arthurs
himself has referred to as the "politics of knowledge."7 Law is
constituted for and of itself by a range of partly complementary and
partly competing discourses which are battling for its "soul." It is also
caught between its growing self-confidence as a discipline and its
continuing sense of dependency on a fragmenting profession that seems
increasingly uncertain about its own knowledge needs, yet highly
suspicious that the academy has lost sight of the "basics."71
The growth in legal research and scholarship has undoubtedly
resulted in new forms of legal knowledge evolving away from the
traditional institutions that have shaped legal knowledge construction-
government, the appellate courts, and legal practice-though these sites
of course still exercise a strong pull for socio-legal as well as doctrinal
scholarship. What has changed is the extent to which legal scholarship is
itself taking place within a contested intellectual and policy context.
68 However, the threat of major liberalization under GATS has temporarily receded, see
Jane Knight, "Trade in Higher Education Services: The Implications of GATS" and "GATS, Trade
and Higher Education: Perspective 2003-Where Are We?" in The Observatory on Borderless
Higher Education, Mapping Borderless Higher Educatior. Policy, Markets and Competition
(London: Association of Commonwealth Universities, 2004). On the wider significance for the
production and circulation of knowledge of globalizing regulatory trends such as GATS and Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, See e.g. John Frow, "Public Domain and the New
World Order in Knowledge" (2000) 10 Social Semiotics 173.
69 Marijk Van der Wende "The Bologna Declaration: Enhancing the Transparency and
Competitiveness of European Higher Education" (2000) XXV:3 Higher Ed. Europe 305; John
Hodgson, "Bologna-How Far Have We Got?" (2004) 38 Law Teacher 341. See also more
generally Julian Webb, "Academic Legal Education in Europe: Convergence and Diversity" (2002)
9 Int. J. Legal Profession 139.
7
°Arthurs, "Political Economy," supra note 8 at 26-28.
71 See e.g. Judge Harry T. Edwards' famous polemic against modern U.S. legal scholarship,
"The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession" (1992) 91 Mich. L.
Rev. 34, and Robert W. Gordon's well-targeted response, "Lawyers, Scholars and the 'Middle
Ground"' (1992) 91 Mich. L. Rev 2075. In the Canadian context, see Justice Michel Bastarache,
"The Role of Academics and Legal Theory in Judicial Decision-Making" (1999) 37 Alta. L. Rev.
739 and Allan C. Hutchinson, "The Role of Judges in Legal Theory and the Role of Legal Theorists
in Judging (or 'Don't Let the Bastaraches Grind You Down')" (2001) 39 Alta. L. Rev. 657. See also
A. Rochette & W. Wesley Pue "'Back to Basics'? University Legal Education and 2 1st Century
Professionalism" (2001) 20 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 167.
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These tensions particularly emerge between the (strong) rearguard
action mounted by black-letter scholarship and the newer
interdisciplinary approaches.72 As Allan Hutchinson has observed, "the
ability of mainstream scholarship to absorb and neutralize new insights
and fresh perspectives on the study of law is truly staggering."73 The
apparent dominance of the mainstream is perhaps reinforced by the
absence of any single, potentially equivalent, counterweight.
Interdisciplinary scholars are to a degree divided amongst themselves:
between the more positivistic empirical social science or "law and
policy" approaches and more "theoretically" grounded insights of
critical (race) theory, feminism, queer theory, postmodernism, and so
on.74 In most law schools, the interdisciplinary in its multiplicity of forms
is still not so imbricated in the structure of degree courses as to supplant
this (modified) black-letterism as the unspoken default position.75
There is another agenda, increasingly driven by government and
industry which potentially cuts across these more traditional debates,
focused on the performativity and commodification of knowledge.76 The
growing curricular emphasis on competence and the development of
transferable skills is the most obvious illustration of this trend, but the
emphasis on knowledge transfer, the prescription of sectoral research
priorities, the act of external research assessment, and the ranking of
72 See e.g. Ian Duncanson, "Degrees of Law: Interdisciplinarity in the Law Discipline"
(1996) 5 Griffith L.R. 77; Douglas W. Vick, "Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law" (2004)
31 J. L. & Soc'y 163.
7 Supra note 71 at 660. Fiona Cownie's research in the United Kingdom seems to support
this idea of absorption; many of the academics she interviewed adopted a modified black-letterism,
leavening doctrine with contextual insights and policy analysis. See F. Cownie, Legal Academics.
Culture and Identities (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003).
4 My intention here is not to suggest that empirical socio-legal research is inherently
atheoretical or theoretically naive-though some of it is, in the same way that some of the
apparently theoretically informed work actually displays a poor grasp of underlying social theory or
philosophy. As Gordon observes, we should be concerned both that there is a vacuity and
pretentiousness in some "post-something-or-other" scholarship (my phrase not Gordon's) and that
empirical research is often "underdone and undervalued" in the law school. See Gordon, supra
note 71 at 2111.
'See e.g. Macdonald, supra note 8. This concern applies both to conventional curriculum
content and to issues such as research training at both LL.B. and postgraduate (LL.M./Ph.D.)
levels. In the United Kingdom the Nuffield Foundation has recently funded an inquiry into the
future capacity of the academy to undertake socio-legal research, given the perceived paucity of
socio-legal research training in law schools.
76 See J.-F. Lyotard, Political Writings, trans. by Bill Readings & Kevin Paul Geiman
(London: UCL Press, 1993) at 6, 50-53. See also Webb, "Post-Fordism," supra note 63.
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law schools can all be seen as consistent with this process of
commodification. As I have argued in a forthcoming paper,7" this is of
considerable practical and epistemological significance to our
conception of the university as a site of disciplinary knowledge, as we
traditionally understand it, and to the construction of disciplines
themselves as specific sites of knowledge and educational praxis. While
not precluding the possibility of pure and abstract disciplinary work, the
academy itself is tending to treat knowledge more as an unstable,
expansive, and decentralised phenomenon.7"
Moreover, research council and governmental policy initiatives
are demanding applied problem-solving in the production of new
knowledge over and above any need for "blue skies" thinking. Michael
Gibbons et al characterise this process as a move from "mode 1" to
"mode 2" knowledge production in the pure and social sciences. They
define mode 1 research as academic, mono-disciplinary and
homogeneous. Mode 2, by contrast, operates in a transdisciplinary
context, delivering applied and contextualized knowledge through
collaborative (multi- or genuinely trans-disciplinary) work, in which
multiple actors bring greater heterogeneity to the research process.7 9
This move is not posited in conventional terms of a discrete paradigm
shift; mode 1 has not simply been displaced by mode 2. Rather, mode 2
is presented as an emergent property of the modern research system.
Clearly, this shift to mode 2 offers both opportunities and
threats. Legal scholarship, as yet, remains relatively sheltered from these
debates, though pressures to engage in policy research and "knowledge
transfer" certainly bring some socio-legal research much closer to mode
2. However, the move toward mode 2 type of thinking is already having
a more general impact on how we construe what counts as (useful)
knowledge both within the university and beyond. There are also risks in
the potential for the underlying performative and often utilitarian
7 "When 'Law and Sociology' Is Not Enough: Transdisciplinarity and the Problem of
Complexity" in Michael D.A. Freeman, ed., Law and Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
forthcoming) [Webb, "Transdisciplinarity"].
7 See variously Merle Jacob & Thomas Hellstr6m, The Future of Knowledge Production
in the Academy (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000); Michael Gibbons et al. The New
Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies
(London: Sage, 1994); and Mattei Dogan & Robert Pahre, Creative Marginality Innovation at the
Intersections of Social Sciences (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990).
'Gibbons et al., ibid.
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agendas of the universities, the research funding bodies, and the state,
to use mode 2 to tie learning more generally to "a narrow, technocratic,
and scientistic means-end rationality." 80
There are growing doubts about what constitutes the core
knowledge of our discipline. Greater flexibility-or even
fragmentation-in provision and pathways could reduce the content-
based coherence of any educational regime; if we want epistemological
coherence, we may need to look'deeper to find it: to the skills, methods,
ethics and underlying philosophy of law. Those same doubts may create
a greater distance between academic and practical law. They may also
further reduce the professional hold over the academic curriculum,
perhaps encouraging the profession (as in England and Wales, possibly)
to find new strategies by which to maintain or even reinforce its control
over legal education.
And yet in the midst of all this change, a surprising number of
our educational practices, and most of the core debates around legal
education, have changed little since the early 1980s."1 Despite the
growth in interdisciplinarity, and despite the greater emphasis on skills
and ethics (in some jurisdictions at least), the student experience is still
dominated by an ethos that often trivializes both (substantive)
knowledge and skills. It "treats 'knowledge,"' in Rochette and Pue's
words, "instrumentally and precisely, as being more a matter of specific
content rather than processes of learning and ways of knowing."82 And it
trivializes skills when it treats the development of skilled behaviours
atomistically, from a perspective of a crude educational behaviourism,
with insufficient regard for either their cognitive content, or ethical
context.83 However, the problem is not (as Rochette and Pue suggest)
the assumption of a false dichotomy between the "academic" and the
"professional" it is more the construction of a false symmetry between
80 Webb, "Transdisciplinarity," supra note 77.
S' This, of course, is not a novel assertion: see e.g. Rochette & Pue, supra note 71 at 169.
82 Ibid. at 186.
8' Note Andy Boon's observation that "[e]ven in more enlightened programmes, the
curriculum is dominated by a cycle of demonstration and rehearsal whereby performance and
assessment is monitored against checklists." "History is Past Politics: A Critique of the Legal Skills
Movement in England and Wales" (1998) 25 J. L. & Soc'y 151 at 164. Note also Julie Macfarlane,
"The Legal Skills Movement Ten Years On: Triumph or Compromise?" Book Review of Teaching
Lawyers'Skills, J. Webb & C. Maughan, ed. (1997) 24 J. L. & Soc'y 440.
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them.' It is this argument that pulls us back to a future shaped by the
ideal of humane professionalism.
IV. HUMANE PROFESSIONALISM: A (RE-)VISION
Debates about pedagogy in law rarely aspire to the heights of
grand theory, which always seems a pity. I say this not simply because I
like theory and think everyone should have one, but because theory can
throw light into some of the darker spaces left after one has ploughed
(again) a well-dug furrow of pragmatic realpolitik. But since neither
theory nor pragmatics is of itself entirely satisfying, I would like to
attempt a middle path, albeit one that I can perforce only begin to flesh
out in this paper." This builds on the following (hopefully contentious)
assumptions.
Pragmatically, we can answer the problem of the relationship
between legal education and practice largely as a matter of functional
differentiation. The academy and legal practice must be viewed as
significantly differentiated sites of knowledge construction and use.86 In
legal education we set out primarily to communicate our map of the
territory of law; we do not (realistically cannot) communicate the
map(s) of legal practice,87 nor the territory of law itself. Like all attempts
at mapping, ours inevitably contains generalizations, deletions, and
4 This is not to suggest that we cannot, or should not build bridges between them; it is to
suggest that the success of any bridge-building enterprise depends on our ability to be reasonably
clear-eyed about the differences.
I This paper thus forms, in part, an entrde into a larger project that I am embarking on,
under the working title "Toward an Ecology of the Legal Mind." The allusion to Gregory Bateson's
work (see infra note 89) in that title is deliberate.
86 Implicit in this statement is a pluralist stance which assumes that the worlds of education
and practice are, at least, semi-autonomous fields of discourse and practice. A more "extreme"
cybernetic or fully autopoietic perspective would go so far as to treat them as self-organizing
systems of signification and communication. See e.g. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System,
Fatima Kastner, ed., trans. by Klaus A. Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 341.
87 The fragmentation and differentiation of legal practice make it less likely that we can
even talk sensibly about practice as a single field or "map"; See e.g. Webb, "Turf Wars," supra note
48 and sources cited there. For a sophisticated application of the mapping metaphor to law, see B.
De Sousa Santos, Toward A New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation,
2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002) c. 8: "The central argument of this chapter is that laws are
literally maps. Maps are ruled distortions of reality, organized misreadings of territories that create
credible illusions of correspondence. By imagining the unreality of real illusions we convert illusory
correspondences into pragmatic orientation, making true William James's dictum that 'the
important thing is to be guided' (ibid. at 419).
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distortions; if it did not it would be indistinguishable from the territory it
seeks to represent.88 Indeed, to paraphrase Gregory Bateson, the
territory never gets a look-in, and never will; all there can be in
education is representation.89
Traditional legal scholarship looks increasingly out-moded, both
as a way of thinking about law and as a mode of learning. It embodies, in
the classical black-letter approach to scholarship, a narrow, formalist,
epistemology which leans heavily towards Wissen ("knowledge as
science") rather than Erkenntnis ("knowledge as a cognitive9" system").
Having long ago substituted Wissen for practice-based knowledge,
Western society now treats practice separately as a mere process-the
application of scientific knowledge in an applied field.91 Paradoxically, it
may seem, I suggest we also need to re-capture practice as part of a
more complex way of knowing that involves multiple sites and processes
of learning and the individual capacity to use multiple "intelligences."92
The continuing tensions between theory and practice, between
new and traditional forms of legal scholarship, particularly in the current
context where knowledge itself seems to be "falling apart,"93 potentially
leave the academy caught in an epistemic trap of its own making,
''oscillating between positions of cognitive autonomy and
heteronomy."94
' To continue the mapping metaphor it would then operate on the same scale and
projection as "the law," which it clearly does not.
89 This is why I would suggest logically that the representations of legal practice are also
just that, and not the territory: "The territory is Ding an sich and you can't do anything with it.
Always the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is only maps of maps
of maps, ad infinitum." Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 2000) at 461-62.
o I use the term cognitive widely here in the sense that we construct ways of knowing as
what might be called a social or cultural epistemology.
'" See e.g. Karl Mackie, "A Strategy for Legal Education Research" (1990) 24 Law Teacher
130 at 140-41.
92Theories of learning are increasingly cognisant of the importance of both environment
and personal elements beyond the cognitive domain, including affect and so-called "emotional
intelligence." See e.g. Joe Cullen et al., Review of Current Pedagogic Research and Practice in the
Fields of Post- Compulsory Education and Lifelong Learning (London: Tavistock Institute, 2002),
online: Tavistock Institute < http://www.tavinstitute.org/getdoc.php?id=22>.
'Mary Douglas, Risk andBlame. Essays in Cultural Theory (London: Routledge, 1992) at
32.
'9 Gunther Teubner, "How the Law Thinks: Towards a Constructivist Epistemology of Law
(1989) 23 L. & Soc'y Rev. 727 at 730.
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In functional terms, this conflict can be resolved by viewing legal
education as a cognitively heteronomous and normatively autonomous
process. Creating the nexus between the humane and the professional
lies in asking the normative question, what is it that law schools ought to
do. Treating this as a question of substantive curriculum content is not
enough. Understanding what lawyers actually do, or asking the various
stakeholders in the academy what they want from legal education are, so
far as they go (and I suggest they go less far than the profession in
particular would like), legitimate questions when seeking to define the
mission of the modern law school. But they too are not enough; they do
not supplant the need for the academy to reflect on its normative
function, as an autonomous moral and (in the widest sense) political
institution.
Moving on to the relationship between the education system and
individual learners, we do not live in a world in which our
representations and understandings of law are wholly divorced from the
other constructs that make up our lifeworld, yet legal education largely
proceeds as if they were. The law, though it objectively exists, cannot
readily be understood simply as an abstract noumenal entity. We
experience it as a culturally-laden, value-oriented subject, and while
there is undoubted value in trying to seek out and understand that
noumenal reality, we need also to acknowledge the law as lived
experience. As Georg Simmel observed, contrary to our societies'
normative beliefs, objectified cultural forms (of technics, science,
philosophy, religion, and so on) serve only a limited function in human
development. So objectified, however, these forms become the
''oppressive master of subjectivity," deprived of their meaning for the
life of individuals.95 Humane professionalism needs to find new ways to
make law "live."
My final normative assumption: if this learning environment is
to be treated as meaningfully complex, it would benefit from what I
describe here as a shift towards an "ecological" concept of knowing.96
9 Georg Simmel, "The Conflict of Modern Culture" in P. Lawrence, ed., Georg Simmel
Sociologist and European (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976) at 223-42.
' I approach this from a position of phenomenological realism. That is, a position defined
by a subjectivist/constructivist epistemology and a realist (as opposed to subjectivist) ontology. A
subjectivist epistemology acknowledges the extent to which we are both constituted by and engaged
in the interpretive understanding of the world, and that any account of "reality" is mediated by
language, culture, and tradition. A realist ontology nevertheless asserts, that whatever our problems
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Each "mind" that engages with "the law" does so within the framework
of a whole "ecology of ideas" 97-and more. Indeed, if we are to take an
ecology of mind seriously in education, then conventional distinctions
between mind/body, reason/emotion, and even internal/ external
representations of mind are all potentially brought into question in the
process of learning.98
What does this framework add to our existing ideas of humane
professionalism? I suggest it has the capacity to re-centre humane
professionalism around the process of education rather than just its
content. It leads us to the real question for legal education, rather than
legal scholarship: how do we bridge the gap between the syllabus and
the students who are looking for a "humane connection to a world that's
overwhelming them."99
In the West, we have become wrapped up in law as the
conjunction of the rule of law and the law as rules. This is difficult to
unpack in the conventional classroom. Law is rules is a strong part of
most of our students' prior culture and understanding of law. Similarly,
rule of law thinking, though important, can also serve to justify
uncritically legalistic approaches to problem-solving. Doctrinalism fits
comfortably with that world view; it reinforces and does not challenge it.
Critical and interdisciplinary work may-and should-challenge it at an
intellectual level, but if left as an intellectual idea, it can do no more,
and in the eclectic curriculum is likely to be marginalised rather than
internalised because there is an alternative, more comfortable, world
view to fall back on.100
in describing that reality, there are nevertheless noumenal real objects which constitute the world
"out there" as a thing-in-itself.
9 7 Bateson, supra note 89 at 467, drawing on Geoffrey Vickers, "The Ecology of Ideas" in
Value Systems and Social Process(New York: Basic Books, 1968).
' For example, Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind- The Bodily Basis of Meaning,
Imagination and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) develops a strong
philosophical argument, drawing on cognitive science, in favour of an "embodied" rationality. On
education itself as an embodied process, see e.g. Erica McWilliam & Peter G. Taylor, eds.,
Pedagogy, Technology and the Body(New York: Peter Lang, 1996); and D. Beckett, "Disembodied
Learning: How Flexible Delivery Shoots higher Education in the Foot, Well Sort of" (1998) 3:3
Electronic J. Sociology, online: <http://www.sociology.org/content/vol003.003/beckett.html >.
I Lisa Ruddick, "The Near Enemy of the Humanities Is Professionalism" 48:13 Chronicle
Higher Education (23 November 2001) B7.
10 Schlegel makes the point that "critical" approaches do not just challenge these pre-
conceptions, they challenge a nascent professional identity (at least for those students who think
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In this context, a humane education is one that seeks to connect
students to their own and others' humanity. As Arthurs has argued, it
"sensitizes prospective lawyers to issues of ethics, public policy or
business realities" and to the "great debates about law and its
relationship to culture, society, the state and individual freedom and
well-being." '' This, I would argue, leads to a more "authentic"
professionalism.0 2
It is not enough to engage with these questions just as abstract
debates: education and "authentic" professionalism need so far as
possible to become lived experience. Too often, law school seeks to
dismiss the situatedness of law in human existence. This, I suggest,
explains at least some of the sense of anomie that commonly
characterises the law school experience. 3 This perspective is of
particular significance in terms of understanding the relationship
between individual learning and action. It can be said that our lived
experience of a phenomenon exists in a reflexive relationship with our
technical knowledge of it. As Markovd observed:
Knowledge is originally directly interwoven with practical activity; only then it detaches
itself and forms itself into a special cognitive "activity." It is not correct to oppose action
and knowledge and treat them as external to each other.l°W
they may become practising lawyers) that wants to see legal education as the key to the kingdom: a
world of specialist professional knowledge unique to the lawyer. Supra note 9 at 1532.
'
0 Arthurs, "Half a League Onward," supra note 16 at 11.
102I have considered the importance of authenticity in constructing the professional self at
greater length in "Being a Lawyer/Being a Human Being" (2002) 5 Legal Ethics 130 ["Webb,
"Being a Lawyer"]; see also Susan Kupfer, "Authentic Legal Practices" (1996) 10 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 34. I came to use the term authenticity only after some considerable thought-really more of
a struggle between my own personal and professional self-for fear of (the latter) being thought
either a throwback to a naive existentialism or an exponent of an equally naive "New Age-ism". In
the end I used it because there was no other word I could find that quite captured that sense of self
I was after. I still worry that I compromised my "self' insofar as much of the passion I felt for the
position I was trying to articulate was lost to the more professional academic voice in which I
articulated it. Ruddick, supra note 99, encapsulates the problem well in discussing her experience of
teaching a graduate humanities seminar on authenticity: "'Authenticity,' like the concept of
'humanity' was raw and inappropriate and had to be properly cooked in order to be discussed."
'03 See e.g. Lawrence S. Krieger, "Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School,
and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence" (2002) 52 J. Legal Ed. 112.
o4Ivana Markovd, Paradigms, Thought and Language (Chichester: Wiley, 1982) at 175.
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Yet this is precisely what legal and other forms of higher
education do most of the time. If a humane professionalism is to have
any impact in the real world, it needs to bridge that gap.
V. CONSTRUCTING THE "SMART" LAW SCHOOL
The spark that ignited my thinking about a new context for
humane professionalism was American educationalist David Perkins'
idea that we need to create "smart schools."1 5 Perkin developed his
ideas in the context of secondary as opposed to higher education, so my
use of his work is fairly broad brush and metaphorical, nevertheless,
what I wish to propose is nothing less than a new ideal type: the
construction of a "smart" law school.
According to Perkins, smart schools exhibit three characteristics.
First, they are informed, in that staff are knowledgeable about thinking
and learning processes. Second, they are energetic in that they seek to
create a physical and cultural environment which nurtures the positive
energies which we associate with a "good" learning process. Third, they
are thoughtful places. Not surprisingly, this seems to be the key
component for Perkins, and it is the element I will focus on most in
presenting this necessarily brief prolegomenon for an ecological legal
education. Smart schools, Perkins says, are thoughtful both in the sense
that they enable learners to "think about and think with what they are
learning" and in the sense that they care-in Dewey's terms, I would say
they have learnt the importance of "prizing the person."
Let me now use this idea to identify four key principles for
ecological instructional design.
A. Learning is multi-dimensional
A move towards whole curriculum "ecological" learning, by
definition, needs to address a range of cognitive, metacognitive and
affective capacities. It is helpful in this endeavour to think about how we
can meaningfully re-frame these to make curriculum design more
comprehensible to all concerned. I propose, therefore, that we think in
terms of four key dimensions (the labels are not my own; they are mostly
" David Perkins, Smart Schools: Better Thinking and Learning for Every Child (New
York: The Free Press, 1995).
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well-known and commonly used to describe aspects of the learning
process).
Know-what This describes the core of the cognitive domain: the
knowledge and understanding of a substantive area, or of the steps
required to complete a particular task. It also includes some extremely
subtle cognitive mapping, for example, of what Paul Churchland has
called "the high dimensional background of social space"° 6 -the
practices of a group or community, their structure, flows, pathologies,
and prohibitions.
Know-how. This encompasses a range of skills and attributes
from the simple to the complex. It includes the higher cognitive skills of
analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. It also includes a range of
metacognitive functions-which largely constitute our ability to
perceive, manipulate, and organize sensory information-and the
capacity for reflection. It could also include a range of psycho-motor
skills, though these tend to be of limited direct relevance to what we
assess in higher education, except that their absence may impact on
students' ability to display other skills or knowledge (for example where
the psycho-motor skills associated with voice production and
modulation are under-developed).
Know-why. This is also largely cognitive terrain, but it usefully
distinguishes the extent to which, in higher education, we attempt to
move beyond basic know-what levels of understanding. To know why
something is so, we need to possess a deep understanding of the systems
and structures involved, and the contexts in which they operate. Know-
why is particularly relevant to developing the capacity for complex
problem solving.
Care-wh. This is probably the most neglected of the quartet. It
draws on the interplay between cognitive, affective, and metacognitive
domains insofar as they all shape our feelings, motivations, and values.
This dimension encompasses the sort of motivational "juice" that
converts, for example, a moral thought into a consistent moral action.
This dimension is also fundamental to the idea of a thoughtful
education because it creates much of the capacity for deep learning,
largely because things which demand a "care-why" response tend to
touch us most personally. In legal education, where we spend so much
" Paul M. Churchland, "The Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues" in Joo Branquinho, ed.,
The Foundations of Cognitive Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) 77 at 86.
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time encouraging students to objectify their learning, we seem to lose
much of that potential:
Introspection is rarely required of students. We are constantly conditioned to write in
certain ways to please examiners, to answer questions succinctly, omitting any irrelevant
information, and preferably to do all of this in an articulate manner! Questioning one's
own thoughts feelings, motivations, and so on seems far more unsettling than questioning
the work or theories of other people.'
7
It is also the part that empowers students to make decisions for
themselves that are "ecological"-to make choices about courses and to
engage in learning processes that are consistent with who and what they
are.
It follows from this first principle that we need to consider what
kinds of learning processes are likely to help us achieve this range and
depth of experiences. This objective underpins my remaining principles.
B. Learning should be strongly experiential
The place to start thinking about learning is with the learner, not
with the knowledge. It is hard to talk of meaningful learning without
first asking, "What does this learner know?" If we do not have at least
some such context, we cannot readily construct situations that are likely
to stretch the individual both cognitively and emotionally. This is not
easy if one is operating in the context of a relatively high-volume, one-
size-fits-all teaching machine.
However, the constructivist notion of "negotiated meaning"
suggests that this may not be quite as hard to achieve as we might
suspect. Constructivism " emphasizes that we actively invent concepts
107 Citing the words of a first year LL.B. student in E. Cassell, "Why Students Choose to
Study Law: Student Perceptions of the Law Degree" paper presented to "Value vs Values in Legal
Education," the 3d Annual Learning in Law Initiative Conference University of Warwick, January
2001, online: <www.ukcle.ac.uk/lili/2001/cassell.html>.
"a An aside, but a necessary one: I am aware that reliance on constructivist thinking is
potentially a double-edged sword. "Mode 2," as discussed above, has the capacity to co-opt the
constructivist re-thinking of learning processes to tie the education system more closely into the
production of the new capitalism-a movement away from education as a process of "improving the
mind" as traditionally understood, and towards the development of people who can work together
to "produce results and add value through distributed knowledge and understanding." James Paul
Gee et al, The New Work Order Behind the Language of the New Capitalism (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1996) at 59. The capacity of capitalisms, new or old, to co-opt counter-hegemonic
discourses and strategies is not novel. Constructivism is still, I hope to show, a game worth playing,
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and models to "make sense" of our experiences. In constructivist
philosophy, cognition is not so much about making sense of a "real"
world, but about making something "right" in the sense that it works
cognitively (again in the wide sense of that term), that is, it fits together
and can account for new cases and new situations." 9 This kind of
knowledge is not made up simply of abstract facts and rules, but
constitutes a personal competence or capacity for action which is
inscribed in each situation: that is, it is grounded in experience."'
The essence of such learning experiences is an act of
comparison, or, as Bateson puts it, a responsiveness to difference."' In
designing such experiences, then, the learning will d epend on our ability
to construct a comprehensible difference that will make a difference. In
teaching law, we already do this to an extent: the change in material
facts that makes the precedent arguable; the shift in logical premise; the
opening for a new policy argument-these are all familiar. The real
potential of difference lies in a humane professionalism's interest in
humanity, not as an abstract idea, but in the lived experience of a
"plurality of persons and their otherness.. ' ..2 It is in the idea of
relationship that we will find the "real" difference that makes a
difference. If modern professionalism is not to de-humanise, we need to
take seriously the power of the ethical imagination: the capacity for
empathy, the need for moral commitments, and the sense of personal
obligation that flows from understanding the very otherness of the
but we need to do so mindful of the need to create spaces and communities of practice to engage
critically with the values and objectives of this-and other--educational discourses.
1"9 See generally Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1984).
"' I hope it will be apparent in what follows that what I suggest here is a significant
broadening of the domain of experiential learning. Conventionally experiential learning is most
closely associated with clinical or other forms of (professional) skills-based learning. This is unduly
narrow: experiential learning as I wish to define it is also central to the development of a whole
range of scholarly capacities, including what William Twining calls the "intellectual skills" involved
in undertaking independent legal research, reasoning and writing. See e.g. William Twining,
"Intellectual Skills at the Academic Stage: Twelve Theses" in Peter B.H. Birks, ed., Examining the
Law Syllabus- Beyond the Core (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
"' Supra note 89 at 315.
12 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. by Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992) at 227.
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Other."3 Indeed, it is through this appreciation of humanity in its
intersubjectivity, in our recognition of others as ends-in-themselves, that
we become not just more sensitive to the potential for violence in law's
construction of power-over another, but also more fully constituted as
,,selves.,"' 
To achieve these more holistic outcomes, we- need to move
beyond the current, somewhat atomistic approach to experiential
learning. What I have in mind is something akin to the problem-based
learning model that has operated at Maastricht Law School and
elsewhere." 5 This builds on assumptions that learning is a constructive,
and highly co-operative, participatory process in which students
"generate knowledge and skills by actively engaging in a dialogue with
the outside world.""' 6 So, how does experience itself become a
difference that makes a difference?
Experience can transform dry propositional knowledge through
its use-it actively changes that knowledge from something that is "out
there" into something far more real and personal to each user. Biggs
uses the term "functional knowledge" to describe what we create for
ourselves by using propositional knowledge and cognitive skills in the
process of solving problems." 7
Furthermore, experience is valuable in helping us to reflect on
how we learn-particularly on how, as learners, we experience the
interplay between cognition and metacognition. This is crucially
important in shaping the effectiveness of learning and in influencing
students' motivations to learn.118
113 See e.g. Finkielkraut, supra note 36 at 21-23; Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity,
trans. by Alfonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1969). See also Donald
Nicolson & Julian Webb, Professional Legal Ethics: Critical Interrogations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999) at 46.
114 See Ricocur, supra note 112 at 220-21 and The Just, trans. by David Pellauer (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000) at xvi-xviii.
" Jos Moust, "The Problem-Based Education Approach at the Maastricht Law School"
(1998) 32 Law Teacher 5; on PBL more generally, see also David Cruickshank, "Problem-Based
Learning in Legal Education" in Webb & Maughan, eds. supra note 44, 187.
n
6
'Moust, ibid. at 29.
117 John B. Biggs, Teaching for Quality Learning at University (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 2003) at 40-41.
"8 See generally Franz E. Weinert, "Metacognition and Motivation as Determinants of
Effective Learning and Understanding" in Franz E. Weinert & Rainer H. Kluwe, eds.,
Metacognition, Motivation and Understanding(Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1987).
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Finally, experience can be invaluable in enabling students to
confront the ethical and human dimensions of law, because it builds up
a "felt acquaintance" '119 with a situation (and the person in that
situation). It enables students to get inside that situation and to
recognise the human "messiness" and value conflict-the very
"beingness" of being a lawyer."' In this way experience becomes both an
antidote to a lack fo perspective, and a powerful tool for learning in its
own right.
C. Good learning environments are "contextually rich and
emotionally engaged"2'
Not all experiences are necessarily good learning experiences.
Good learning environments tend to be realistically complex, and
sufficiently messy to create an element of confusion. 22 Confusion
(provided it is not overwhelming) can provide the critical emotional
sparks that generate learning. The kind of purposive learning that such
messy situations demand actively changes the learning process into a
more meaningful, lasting, and transformative experience. Creating
learning experiences that are positive and intrinsically motivating will
similarly support more powerful learning. Enabling students to
extrapolate their prior understanding and identify ways in which that
understanding has changed for themselves in the process of learning
also increases the contextual richness of the learning experience.
D. Don't forget the humanistic dimension
Experience can also open our eyes more fully to the
"humanistic" and "aesthetic" dimensions of our subject. As Thomas
Nagel points out, "[o]ur own experience provides the basic material for
19 John Heron, Group Facilitation: Theories and Models for Practice (London: Kogan
Page, 1993) at 71.
'See Webb, "Being a Lawyer," supra note 102.
1 This phrase is taken from Alan M. Lerner, "Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science
and Social Psychology Teach Us About Teaching Law Students to Make Ethical, Professionally
Responsible, Choices (2004) 23 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 643 at 689.
122 Donald Sch6n's reflective practice model, supra note 31, recognized this in its contrast
between the "high ground" of technical-rational knowledge and the "swamp" of practice.
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our imagination., 123 To expand the horizons of our students' experiences
is to expand the horizons of their (legal) imagination. This leads to my
last point.
Much of law's structure and power resides in what Goodrich
calls its "masks"-its language, "theatre," and history.1 24 Through these
elements we create, in our role as teachers, a "discourse of authority"
125
that serves to construct a particular reality. The dark side of both
academic and legal professionalism is its capacity to de-humanize, both
by denting some of the student/lawyers own humanity and sense of self-
worth, and by neglecting the more human dimensions and aspirations of
law: "You lose some of your personality doing a law degree ... . [I]t
disciplines you.' ' 126 This is why the conjunction of the humane and the
professional matters.
A constant theme of this paper has been that if we are to
progress the liberal and ethical claims of legal education in this
increasingly globalized and culturally diverse environment, we need to
foster a commitment to a more humanistic and historical understanding
of the place of law in human culture. The study of film, literature, and
history all have an important part to play in developing this more
humanistic perspective on law, but we also have opportunities to make
our students' personal narratives-their own experiences of law, and of
studying law-more directly relevant to their learning and our own. This
may open a debate on a whole range of cultural and contextual
assumptions about law, and may help us overcome the assumption,
exhibited by students and teachers alike, that prior learning is irrelevant.
It is not. It can fundamentally shape both what and how students learn.
A first step in unlocking prior knowledge and learning is to create
learning processes which show that such prior learning is valued
'Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974) 83 Phil. Rev. 435 at 439.
124 Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990).
't Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Oxford: Polity Press/Blackwell, 1990)
at 22.
26 Spoken by a final year LL.B. student in 1993, quoted in Webb, "Where the Action Is,"
supra note 31 at 193. Compare also Peter Goodrich's description of the law school experience as an
"institutionally managed trauma [which] gives birth to a conforming or believing soul" in "Of
Blackstone's Tower: Metaphors of Distance and Histories of the English Law School" in Peter
Birks, ed., Pressing Problems in the Law, Vol. 2: What Are Law Schools For? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996).
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Models of university teaching framed around the notion of
reflective conversation may serve as a potential mechanism for enabling
this plurality of voices to be heard, and in a way that fits with the kind of
experiential framework I have already discussed. Creating opportunities
for students to participate in the collaborative construction of
knowledge is, as Paul Maharg has cogently argued, deeply important for
learning and teaching:
[I]f social negotiation of meaning within disciplinary communities is important for the
transfer of meaning, then students need to be inducted into what one might regard as the
syntax of the community, its attitudes, logical forms, genres, procedures and belief
systems, as well as what one might regard as its substantive content. Co-operation in
learning thus becomes a powerful heuristic.127
Such approaches view the learning process as one of continuing
dialogue between teacher and students, and amongst students
collaboratively, whereby they formulate shared goals and learning
outcomes that lead them to construct a common language and tools for
understanding. This is essential to the construction of the law school's
identity as envisaged by the Arthurs Report as both an intellectual
community in its own right, and as a foundation upon which a more
meaningful sense of (legal) professionalism can be developed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The argument for a constructivist humane professionalism
challenges us to be explicit about the values that fashion both the
academic genre and the practice of law, the practice of law teaching, and
indeed our conception of the law school as a community of learners.
The Arthurs Report reminds us to ask what is possible. At the
same time, it provides us with a very real warning: whatever the
importance of law itself, our world is insular and relatively marginal to
all but ourselves and our current students. For most of the time it excites
only limited interest in the practising profession and in government.128
Perhaps it is this relative indifference that matters most of all; if we, the
law teachers, don't care, who will? In this way the Arthurs Report still
has the power to challenge us, to demand that we make choices about
127 "Rogers, Constructivism and Jurisprudence: Educational Critique and the Legal
Curriculum" (2000) 7 Int'l J. L. Profession 189 at 193-94.
28 Arthurs Report, supra note I at 5-6.
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our own professionalism as teachers and scholars of law. Are we willing
to step beyond the detachment of traditional scholarship to engage in a
real and ongoing exchange: the moral and political debate about what
undermines and sustains us as a community?. 129 The prize is the
possibility of re-connecting with both our own and our students'
humanity and professionalism.
'
29 See Ruddick, supra note 99.
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